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CONGLOMERATE MERGERS: A MONOPOLY
PROBLEM?
RICHARD A. MILLER*
INTRODUCTION
The conglomerate nature of the recent merger movement has attracted
much attention and caused some alarm. Without doubt merger activity is
greater and conglomerate mergers are relatively more numerous than a
decade or two ago. However, in expressing concern over the conglomerate
trend, economists who study such industrial and market phenomena seem
to lag somewhat behind other critical commentators.
There is ample academic precedent, if not justification, for such belated
alarm.' The American economy has seen three such movements. The first,2
concentrated in the years 1898-1903, as well as the second movement, occur-
ring during the 1920's and early 1930's, apparently produced oligopolies
(and sometimes single firm monopolies) by increasing substantially the share
of market or industry output controlled by one or a few firms. Such mergers
substantially increased monopoly power in the industries where they oc-
curred. The current merger movement, starting in the middle 1950's, seems
marked by diversification; that is, by merger the acquiring firms are moving
into new markets, both product markets and geographic market areas. If the
first two movements can be described as "monopoly and oligopoly by
merger," then the third may be described as "diversity by merger." Un-
fortunately, at the time the first merger movement occurred, it was mis-
studied by the leading economists, who generally neglected the monopoly
aspects of the mergers.3 And the second, "less spectacular" wave of the
Visiting Associate Professor of Business Administration, University of California,
Berkeley; Department of Economics, Wesleyan University. A.B., Oberlin College, 1952;
M.A., Yale University, 1957; Ph.D., Yale University, 1962, I am indebted to Jon Ras-
mussen for his comments on a previous draft and to Maurice Moonitz for discussion on
accounting issues; neither should be associated with the errors, views, and biases of this
article.
1 Concerned economists include: J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967);
J. NARVER, CONGLOMERATE MERGERS AND MARKET COMPETITION (1967); Blair, Conglomerate
Mergers-Theory and Congressional Interest, in PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD MERGERS 179 (J.
Weston & S. Peltzman eds. 1969) [hereinafter cited as J. Weston & S. Peltzman]; Blair,
The Conglomerate Merger in Economics and Law, 16 GEo. L.J. 632 (1958); Campbell &
Shepherd, Leading Firm Conglomerate Mergers, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 1361 (1968); Edwards,
Conglomerate Bigness as a Source of Power, in BUSINESS CONCENTRATION AND PRICE
POLICY 331 (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research ed. 1955); Weston, Summary of Discussions on
Conglomerate Mergers, in J. Weston & S. Peltzman 219.
2 This neglects a weak wave of industrial mergers in 1889-1892 and another wave of
railroad mergers. Stigler, Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger, 40 AM. ECON. REV. 918
(1950), reprinted in THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 95 (G. Stigler ed. 1968).
8 In a widely quoted passage, Stigler laments the role of economists during the
early merger period:
It is sobering to reflect on the attitudes of professional economists of the period
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1920's apparently generated little interest among economists who were
intent upon studying the first merger movement and the depression. For
the third merger movement, Professor Reid notes that the "less than
impressive" list of publications on mergers by economists seems to indicate
"scant concern of economists about current merger activity." 4 Their "scant
concern" about conglomerate mergers, at least over the antitrust implica-
tions, probably stems from a fundamental difficulty: antitrust laws are in-
tended to discourage the acquisition of monopoly power, and the analytical
links between a conglomerate merger and an increase in monopoly power
are generally unconvincing to many economists. Either the links must be
more carefully forged, or the appropriate directions for policy must be more
carefully indicated. This is one effort in the latter direction. 5
The argument proceeds in three steps. First, some statistical informa-
tion regarding the current merger movement and the state of corporate
diversity in United States' industry suggest their direction and importance.
Second, some comments on the developing antitrust policy on conglomerate
mergers suggest that the apparent thrust of that policy rests on deficient
economic analysis. And third, the circumstances surrounding conglomerate
mergers and corporate diversity include financial or profit motivations
toward the merger movement. Economists as wise as Taussig, as incisive as Fisher,
as fond of competition as Clark and Fetter, insisted upon discussing the move-
ment largely or exclusively in terms of industrial evolution and the economies
of scale. They found no difficulty in treating the unregulated corporation as
a natural phenomenon, nor were they bothered that the economies of scale
should spring forth suddenly and simultaneously in an enormous variety of
industries - and yet pass over the minor firms that characteristically persisted
and indeed flourished in these industries. One must regretfully record that in
this period Ida Tarbell and Henry Demarest Lloyd did more than the American
Economic Association to foster the policy of competition.
Id. at 103. However, one must also record that substantial publications, some by econo-
mists, appear on the other side of the balance sheet; pre-1906 authors include Ernest
von Halle (1895), R. T. Ely (1900), J. W. Jenks (1900), W. M. Collier (1900), Luther Conant
(1901), C. J. Bullock (1901), J. E. LeRossignol (1901), E. J. Nolan (1904), John Moody
(1904), W. Z. Ripley (1905), and the INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION REPORT ON TRUSTS AND IN-
DUSTRIAL COMBINATIONS, with hearings and related documents (1901). Markham dates the
first movement as 1887-1904. Markham, Survey of the Evidence and Findings on Mergers,
in BUsINESS CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY 154 (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research ed. 1955).
See also R. NELSON, MERGER MOVEMErTS IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 1895-1956 (1959); Chandler,
The Structure of American Industry in the Twentieth Century: An Historical Overview,
43 Bus. HISTORY REv. 255 (1969); Eis, The 1919-1930 Mergers Movement in American
Industry, 12 J. LAW & ECON. 267 (1969).
4 Reid, Mergers and the Economist, 14 ANTITRUST BULL. 371, 378-79 (1969). On the
other hand, the current wave has not gone entirely unnoticed. See note 1 supra.
5 Further interpretation and analyses of conglomerate mergers may require new tools
of analysis. The marginal revenue curve, so helpful in describing and interpreting mo-
nopoly, was discovered and thrust into prominence only after the second merger move-
ment had subsided, with the publication of E. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLIS-
TIC COMPETITION (lst ed. 1933), and J. ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT
COMPETITION (1933). And it wasn't until 1951 that an economist published an empirical
demonstration of a relationship between market structure (a concentration ratio reflecting
monopoly power) and market performance (the profitability of firms) for a sample of
industries. Bain, Relation of Profit Rate to Industry Concentration: American Manufac-
turing, 1936-1940, 65 Q.J. ECON. 293 (1951).
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which are independent of increases in monopoly power. Indeed, conglom-
erate mergers may improve the state of competition.
I. SOME BASIC DATA ON CONGLOMERATE MERGERS AND
CORPORATE DIVERSrY
The conglomerate nature of the current merger movement, underway
for a decade and a half, is well known. As Table I indicates, over 2/ of the
large mergers in the 1948-1968 period, whether measured by the number
TABLE I
NUMBER AND ASSETS (MILLIONS) OF AcQUIsrIONS OF MANUFACTURING AND MINING FIRMS
WITH ASSETS OF $10 MILLION OR MORE, BY TYPE OF AcQuISITION
1967-19682 1948-19682
Type No. Assetsl No. Assetsl
Horizontal 26 $1,578 210 $7,541
Vertical 34 1,407 173 6,703
Conglomerate 301 17,853 899 37,985
Product Extension 216 9,687 646 22,264
Market Extension 1 749 53 3,561
Other 84 7,417 200 12,160
Total 361 20,838 1,282 52,229
1 Assets in millions of dollars.
2 Data for 1968 are preliminary, and the entire merger series is under revision by the
Federal Trade Commission.
SOURCES: BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, FTC, LARGE MERGERS IN MANUFACTURING AND MINING
1948-1968, Table 2 (1969); CURRENT TRENDS IN MERGER ACTIVITY, 1968, Table
II (1969).
of acquisitions or by the assets acquired, have been classified as conglom-
erate in the Federal Trade Commission merger data.6 The number of all
large mergers (and assets acquired) has been increasing, but the number
(and assets) of large conglomerate mergers has been increasing at a slightly
faster pace; hence conglomerate large mergers, as a percentage of total
large mergers, have been larger in recent years. In 1967-1968 over % of
the large mergers (number and assets acquired) have been conglomerate.7
In the post war period, an increase has also occurred in the relative
importance of large firms throughout both the manufacturing sector and
the economy. The largest firms have, during the past two decades, accounted
for an increasing share of assets, sales, value added, or any other measure
of aggregate business activity. Table II presents the percentage of value
6 The entire merger series was under revision and published in the BUREAU OF
ECONOMICS, FTC, ECONOMIC REPORT ON CORPORATE MERGERS (1969). "Large mergers" are
defined as those whose assets are "$10,000,000 or more"; the emphasis on large mergers
seems reasonable, since many small mergers are undetected by the FTC.
7 One substantial reason, of course, for the increasing relative importance (but not
necessarily the growth in absolute numbers) of conglomerate mergers is the increased
stringency in antitrust policy on vertical and horizontal mergers.
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TABLE II
SHARE OF VALUE ADDED BY MANUFACTURE ACCOUNTED FOR BY LARGEST
MANUFACTURING COMPANIES
1963, 1958, 1954, 1947
Percent Value Added by Manufacture
Company Rank Groups 1963 1958 1954 1947
Largest 50 companies 25 23 23 17
Companies ranked 51-100 8 7 7 6
Companies ranked 101-150 4 5 4 4
Companies ranked 151-200 4 3 3 3
Largest 200 companies 41 38 37 30
SOURCE: SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., 2D SESS., CONCENTRATION RATIOS IN
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 1963 (Comm. Print 1966).
added by manufacture, accounted for by the largest manufacturing com-
panies for the four post World War II years in which a census of manu-
facturers was undertaken. Between 1947 and 1963 the largest 200 companies
increased their share of manufacturing value added from 30 percent to 41
percent. Generally, this relative increase occurred among the largest 50;
8 of the 11 percentage points were garnered by this group, as its share in-
creased from 17 percent to 25 percent.8
This increase in "overall concentration" of assets, sales, or, as indicated
by Table II, value added in manufacturing, contrasts with changes in con-
centration of sales (value of shipments) in individual industries. Of the over
400 4-digit S.I.C. industries in manufacturing, 213 provide comparable data
for the same 1947-1963 period. Table III indicates that changes in the four-
firm concentration ratio9 appear reasonably balanced. This measure of
8 The share of total assets of all manufacturing corporations held by the 50 largest
manufacturing corporations rose from 34.7 percent in 1948 to 37.3 percent in 1964 (a
slight fall from 38.2 percent in 1962). For the 500 largest, the percentage rose from 58.4
percent to 68.0 percent (1962) and 67.2 percent (1964). Berry, Conglomerate Bigness and
Diversification in Manufacturing, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 402, 413 (1967). Professor Berry dis-
cusses the differences in these two measures (assets and value added in manufacturing)
of "overall concentration" and suggests that the increases may be levelling off. The latter
point seems consistent with the projections in McGowan, The Effect of Alternative Anti-
merger Policies on the Size Distribution of Firms, 5 YALE ECON. ESSAYS 423 (1965). For a
century long review of "overall concentration," see J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION ch. 4
(2d ed. 1968), who argues that "overall concentration" has remained relatively stable
since the end of the first merger movement. See also Collins & Preston, The Size Structure
of the Largest Industrial Firms, 1909-1958, 51 AM. ECON. REv. 986 (1961).
9 The share of the value of shipments was accounted for by the largest four firms. This
is a widely accepted and imperfect measure of monopoly power in an industry. Of course,
concentration might have fallen in this period if all mergers- including conglomerate-
had been forbidden. For a discussion of problems of interpretation of this measure, see
J. BAIN, supra note 8, at ch. 5, and Bain, supra note 5, at 299-303; Rosenbluth, Measures
of Concentration, in BUSINESS CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY 57 (Nat'l Bureau Econ.
Research ed. 1955). See also Hall & Tideman, Measures of Concentration, 62 J. Am. STAT.
Ass'N 162 (1967). For a discussion of the stability of industry concentration in the 1947-
1958 period, see Shepherd, Trends in Concentration in American Manufacturing Indus-
tries, 1947-1958, 46 REv. ECON. & STAT. 200 (1964).
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TABLE III
NUMBER OF INDUSTRIES AND VALUE OF 1963 SHIPMENTS By CHANGE
IN LEVEL OF CONCENTRATION 1947 TO 1963
Number of Industries in which 4-Firm
Concentration Ratio
Increased 3 Changed less Decreased 3
percentage than 3 percentage
Number of points percentage points
Type of Industry Industries or more points or more
Producer Goods 132 38 32 62
Consumer Goods 81 43 14 24
Total 213 81 46 86
Shipments in 1963
Value
($ million) Percent Distribution of Shipments (percent)
Producer Goods 103,854 100 21 22 57
Consumer Goods 71,867 100 54 17 29
Total 175,721 100 35 20 45
SOURCE: Adapted from W. MUELLER, HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE CELLER-
KEFAUVER ACT: SIXTEEN YEARS OF ENFORCEMENT, H.R. Doc. No. 336, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess., Table 12 (1967).
monopoly increased 3 percentage points or more in 81 industries, decreased
3 percentage points or more in 86 industries, and remained substantially
unchanged in the remaining 46 industries. There are some differences
between producer goods and consumer goods industries which tend to
balance each other. Measured by value of shipments (a method of weighting
the industries by their relative size), the increased concentration covered
35 percent, the decreased concentration covered 45 percent (using ± 3 per-
centage points) as shown in Table III. Again some differences between
producer goods and consumer goods industries appear. These data are con-
sistent with general overall stability in industry concentration; although
some industries demonstrate change, there appears no widespread increase
(or decrease) in concentration in the group of individual industries.
These two observations, that in the post war period concentration in
individual industries shows no general increase, while "overall concentra-
tion" has been increasing, are consistent with an increase in corporate
diversity;' 0 large firms are spreading their operations into an increasing
number of industries by merger. One indication of this increasing corporate
diversity is given in Table IV. Companies enumerated in the various eco-
nomic censuses are classified into one of 179 "Enterprise Industry Cat-
10 They are also consistent with the possibility that highly concentrated industries
(with large firms) are growing more rapidly (without changing the relative shares of
firms in each of those industries) than the less concentrated industries. This apparently
has not happened. Berry, supra note 8, and Shepherd, supra note 9. Neither does it
help to explain the merger ,data of Table I.
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TABLE IV
DISTRIBUTION OF COMPANIES, ESTABLISHMENTS, EMPLOYEES, AND SALES AND RECEIPTS
BY INDUSTRY DIVISION AND BY TYPE OF COMPANY, 1963 AND 1958
All Industries
1963 1958
Number Percentage Number Percentage
Number of companies total 3,293,313 100.0 3,229,114 100.0
Single unit companies 3,198,384 97.1 3,137,719 97.1
Multi-unit single 66,165 2.0 57,327 1.8
industry companies
Multi-unit multi- 28,764 0.9 34,068 1.1
industry companies
Number of establishments total 3,687,556 100.0 3,571,088 100.0
Single unit companies 3,198,384 86.7 3,137,719 87.9
Multi-unit single 206,963 5.6 185,099 52
industry companies
Multi-unit multi- 282,209 7.7 248,270 6.9
industry companies
Number of employees total 33,270,321 100.0 30,956,558 100.0
Single unit companies 14,694,761 44.2 14,295,248 46.2
Multi-unit single 3,226,454 9.7 3,516,146 11.4
industry companies
Multi-unit multi- 15,349,106 46.1 13,145,164 42.4
industry companies
Sales and receipts ($1,000,000) 936,006 100.0 742,243 100.0
Single unit companies 432,340 46.2 364,765 49.2
Multi-unit single 96,110 10.3 85,945 11.6
industry companies
Multi-unit multi- 407,557 43.6 291,534 39.3
industry companies
SOURCE: Adapted from U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, ENTERPRISE STATISTICS: 1963, PART I-
GENERAL REPORT ON INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION Table 8, at 160 (1968).
egories" covering mineral industries, manufacturing, public warehousing,
wholesale trade, retail trade, and selected services. These categories are
roughly at the 3-digit S.I.C. level of aggregation, hence the industries
are broader (including more products) than the 4-digit industries used
to compute the industry concentration ratios. Similarly each establishment
(or plant) is classified into one of the same 179 categories. A company classi-
fied in one enterprise industry category may own establishments classified
in different categories, hence it may be a multi-industry or diversified com-
pany. As Table IV indicates, of 3.3 million companies in 1963, 28,764 (0.9
percent) were multi-unit and multi-industry. When establishments (rather
than companies) are thus classified, 282,209 establishments (7.7 percent of
the 3.7 million) are owned by multi-unit, multi-industry companies. Sim-
ilarly 46.1 percent of the employees in all companies are employed by, and
43.6 percent of sales and receipts are made by, multi-unit, multi-industry
companies. Compared with 1958, the only other previous year for which
comparable data are available, these three percentages have increased, each
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by about one-tenth in the five years. Corporate diversity apparently is
increasing.
Another indication of both the level of, and the increase in, diversity is
contained in the Industry Specialization Ratios (ISR) reported in Table V
TABLE V
INDUSTRY SPECIALIZATION RATIOS, 1954, 1958, AND 1963
(based on employees)
For companies classified
in one of the Census
Enterprise Industry
Categories in the
following industry
divisions: 1963 1958 1954 1958 1954
All Industries 84.8 87.6 (NA) 88.3 89.5
Mineral Industries 88.5 89.3 93.9 89.9 93.9
Manufacturing 76.2 80.8 (NA) 81.4 83.8
Public Warehousing 96.9 93.5 98.8 93.5 98.8
Wholesale Trade 96.2 96.2 (NA) 95.7 96.3
Retail Trade 94.2 95.5 96.8 96.4 96.8
Selected Services 96.9 97.6 99.0 98.2 99.0
SoURCrs: The first three columns for 1954, 1958, and 1963, based on the 1963 S.I.C., are
derived from U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, ENTERPRISE STATISTICS: 1963 PART 1-
GENERAL REPORT ON INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION App. A. (1968) (enterprise in-
dustry categories number 179). The last two columns for 1954 and 1958, based
on the 1954 S.I.C., are derived from U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, ENTERPRISE
STATISTICS: 1958, PART I-GENERAL REPORT Table 3 (1963). (The industry cat-
egories number 122.) Changes in the S.I.C. in the 1954-1963 decade make full
comparability difficult.
for 1954, 1958, and 1963. Since each company and each establishment (plant)
is classified into one of the 179 Enterprise Industry Categories, the com-
panies classified in a particular industry may own establishments classified
in another industry. Using employees as a standard for a particular industry,
the ratio of: (1) employees in establishments classified in the same industry
as the owning company to, (2) all employees of companies classified in that
industry provides the Industry Specialization Ratio. For 1 of the 179 enter-
prise industry categories a value of unity (or 100 percent) indicates that
companies classified in that industry category own no plants (with em-
ployees) which are classified in another industry category. If the ratio falls
below unity, the companies in that industry are diversified to the extent
that they own plants (with employees) classified in other industry categories.
The ISR's for 1954, 1958 and 1963 indicate that companies in the manu-
facturing division are more marked by diversity than companies in the
other five industry divisions. Indeed, companies in warehousing, whole-
saling, retailing, and services are relatively undiversified. Increases in di-
versity, indicated by an ISR falling over time, are occurring in all six
industry divisions.
However, the ISR should be interpreted as only a crude measure of
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diversity. It probably understates actual diversity both by not measuring
the extent of product differentiation in establishments classified in the same
industry as the owning company and by taking as its market delineation
the 179 Enterprise Industry Categories, most of which undoubtedly are too
broadly defined, at the 3-digit level, by including several non-substi-
tutable products in the same "industry." Moreover, "diverse" is not a
synonym for "conglomerate," since the ISR may fall below one hundred if
a company in that industry is vertically integrated by owning a plant from
which it "buys" inputs or to which it "sells" outputs.
The contrast between diversity in manufacturing and diversity in other
(non-manufacturing) enterprise industry categories is demonstrated by the
classification of the 179 categories by size of their ISR's. Considerably more
of the 112 manufacturing categories display smaller ISR's than do the the
67 non-manufacturing categories, as Table VI shows. Indeed in 1963, 53 of
TABLE VI
MANUFACTURING AND NON-MANUFACTURING ENTERPRISE CATEGORIES,
BY INDUSTRY SPECIALIZATION RATIOS: 1963 AND 1958
Census Enterprise
Industry Categories,
by Industry Special-
ization Ratio 1963 1958
All Enterprise 179 179
Industry Categories
Manufacturing Categories 112 112
With Industry
Specialization
Ratios of
40 to 59% 7 5
60 to 69% 13 5
70 to 79% 33 23
80 to 89% 28 37
90% or more 31 42
Non-Manufacturing 67 67
Categories
With Industry
Specialization
Ratios of
40 to 69% 0 0
70 to 79% 1 1
80 to 89% 8 6
90% or more 58 60
SOURCE: Adapted from U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, ENTERPRISE STATISTICS: 1963, PART I-
GENERAL REPORT ON INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION Table F, at 17 (1968).
112 manufacturing industry categories had ISR's less than 80 percent, an
increase from 33 in 1958; for non-manufacturing, the number was 1 in both
years.
The ISR, in a rough way, indicates the extent to which companies
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classified in an industry are diversified into other activities. In a similar
fashion, there is a measure of the extent to which establishments (plants)
in one industry are owned by companies classified in other industries. Such
a measure is the Ownership Specialization Ratio; for one of the 179 Enter-
prise Industry Categories, it is the ratio of: (1) employees of establishments
(plants) classified in that industry if the companies owning those establish-
ments are classified in that same industry too, (2) employees of all establish-
ments classified in that industry, regardless of industry classification of the
owning company. If this ratio is 100 percent, no establishments classified
in that industry are owned by companies classified in other industry cat-
egories. If the ratio falls below 100 percent, establishments in that industry
are owned by companies in other industries. Thus, the Ownership Special-
ization Ratio (OSR) for one of the 179 industry classification indicates the
extent to which companies in other industries have diversified into that
industry.
Table VII, reproducing the OSR's in 1954, 1958, and 1963, indicates
considerable ownership of mineral and manufacturing plants by companies
TABLE VII
OWNERSHIP SPECIALIZATION RATIOS, 1954, 1958, AND 1963
(based on employees)
For establishments
classified in one of the
Enterprise Industry
Categories in the
following Industry
divisions: 1963 1958 1954 1958 1954
All Industries 85.4 87.6 (NA) 88.2 89.1
Mineral Industries 66.3 70.7 72.1 71.7 72.1
Manufacturing 79.3 82.8 (NA) 83.3 85.2
Public Warehousing 94.2 94.5 94.3 94.5 94.3
Wholesale Trade 89.8 89.7 (NA) 89.4 91.4
Retail Trade 93.3 94.6 95.7 95.5 95.7
Selected Services 95.4 96.0 97.9 96.7 97.9
SOURCE: The first three columns for 1954, 1958, and 1963, based on the 1963 S.I.C., are
derived from U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, ENTERPRISE STATISTICS: 1963, PART I-
GENERAL REPORT ON INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION App. A (1968) (enterprise in-
dustry categories number 179). The last two columns for 1954 and 1955, based
on the 1954 S.I.C., are derived from U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, ENTERPRISE
STATISTICS: 1958, PART I-GENERAL REPORT Table 2 (1963) (the industry categories
number 122).
classiffied in a different Enterprise Industry Category; probably this owner-
ship is by manufacturing firms seeking to improve their access to raw ma-
terial supplies. Since this ratio appears generally falling over time in
Enterprise Industry Categories in all six industry divisions, diversity into
industries, as measured by the OSR, seems to be increasing.
Again diversity measured by the OSR (in a manner similar to the ISR)
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may be understated; the enterprise industry categories, at the 3-digit
level of S.I.C. detail, are too broad, and intra-plant diversity of production
escapes measurement entirely. Moreover, the OSR may reflect vertical in-
tegration; hence the concept of diversity by this measure is not synonymous
with conglomerate.
This brief survey of some data relevant to conglomerate mergers and
corporate diversity supports several generalizations concerning the American
economy. Even though industry concentration in the manufacturing sector
(as measured by 4-digit, four-firm concentration ratios) has remained
relatively unchanged during the post war period, the "overall concentra-
tion" within the largest firms in manufacturing has been increasing. Mergers
are numerous, involve substantial assets, and are characterized by the in-
creasing importance of conglomerate, rather than vertical and horizontal,
mergers. The extent of diversity seems relatively great in manufacturing,
but the trend to diversify, as the various measures change over time, extends
throughout the economy.
II. SOME BASIC ECONOMICS OF THE DEVELOPING
CONGLOMERATE MERGER POLICY
In its early years of enforcement, the Sherman Act" seemed ineffective
in preventing the formation of "trusts" or monopolies. Proscription of con-
tracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of trade failed to stop or
impede the first merger movement. Occasionally, corporations were dis-
solved after they had become full-blown monopolies.' 2 In 1914, Congress
identified for special treatment a proven method for acquiring monopoly:
acquisitions of shares of stock to effect "trusts," the favorite device for pool-
ing assets, coordinating price and output decisions, and thus blunting
competition. Mergers by acquisition of "stock or other share capital" were
forbidden when certain economic effects could reasonably be anticipated:
the substantial lessening of competition, the restraint of commerce, or the
tendency to create a monopoly. By isolating mergers by stock acquisition,
and proscribing them under monopoly-creating conditions, potential Sher-
man Act cases could be nipped in the bud.13
1115 U.S.C.§§ 1-7 (1964).
12Some examples of dissolution: United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S.
106 (1911); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); Northern Securities Co. v.
United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904). Among others, U.S. Steel escaped: United States v.
United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
13 Also identified in the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-
27 (1964), were price discrimination, tying and exclusive dealing contracts, and inter-
locking directorates. The purpose was "to arrest the creation of trusts.., in their in-
cipiency .. " S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914). More recently, "[t]he
intent. . . is to cope with monopolistic tendencies in their incipiency and well before
they have attained such effects as would justify a Sherman Act proceeding." S. REP. No.
1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1950). See also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 31f-24 (1962); REPORT OF THE ATr'y GEN'S NAT'L COrM. TO STUDY ANTITRUST LAWS
115, 718 (1955); W. LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA 275-76 (1965); Blair,
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The loopholes in this initial section 7 of the Clayton Act soon became
painfully evident. The purchase of assets (rather than stock) provided an
obvious escape.14 Even stock acquisitions, if the physical assets were trans-
ferred to the acquiring firm with sufficient dispatch, were ruled immune.15
More important, for illegality the economic effect on competition had to
occur between the acquiring and acquired companies.16 This was widely,
and properly, interpreted to mean that only horizontal mergers, those be-
tween rival sellers,17 could be attacked under the original section 7; vertical
mergers (those between a customer and a supplier) and conglomerate
mergers (those involving firms serving separate markets) escaped prosecution.
The 1950 Celler-Kefauver amendment to section 7 plugged these
"loopholes." Not only did the amendment specify asset as well as stock
acquisitions, but it also extended coverage to all mergers by omitting men-
tion of the acquiring and acquired companies. The congressional purpose,
according to the Report of House Committee on the Judiciary, was
to make it clear that the bill applies to all types of mergers and acquisi-
tions, vertical and conglomerate as well as horizontal, which have the
specified [economic] effects ....
If, for example, one or a number of raw-material producers purchases
firms in a fabricating field (i.e., a "forward vertical" acquisition), and if
as a result thereof competition in that fabricating field is substantially
lessened in any section of the country, the law would be violated, even
though there did not exist any competition between the acquiring (raw
material) and the acquired (fabricating) firms.
The same principles would, of course, apply to backward vertical and
conglomerate acquisitions and mergers.'8
Thus, the clause specifying the economic effects - "where in any line of
commerce in any section of the country the effect of such acquisition may
be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly" - was
in J. Weston & S. Peltzman, supra note 1; Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the
Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARV. L. REv. 226, 233 (1960).
14 FTC v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926).
15Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587 (1934).
16 "[W]here the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition
between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and with the corporation making
the acquisition or to restrain such commerce in any section or community or tend to
create a monopoly of any line of commerce .... " 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
17 Or between rival buyers, although the emphasis in court proceedings is generally
on rivalry in selling rather than rivalry in buying because of the factual conditions of
most cases.
18 H.R. REp. No. 1191, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. 11 (1949) (emphasis added). The wording
of the 1950 Celler-Kefauver amendment to section 7:
[N]o corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly,
the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the
whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in com-
merce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect
of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
create a monopoly.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
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intended to apply to conglomerate (as well as vertical and horizontal)
mergers.
Competition in economicst 9 means rivalry: rivalry in price, in quality,
and in product improvement. A company supplying a product competes
with his rivals if it shades--lowers--its price or introduces a better
product. Consumers face alternative suppliers who vie, in price and quality,
for their custom. And in the long run the price of the product approximates
the cost of production, which reflects the bidding of resources from alterna-
tive occupations.
In contrast, monopoly power in economics means the ability to raise
price (or neglect product quality and improvement) and to restrict output
sold in a market. Such ability to restrict supply is profitable because fewer
units can be sold at a higher price. This may be possible if suppliers in a
market are few enough (or a few suppliers together are large enough in
relation to total market supply), so that 'collective (perhaps not collusive)
behavior lessens rivalry in price. By recognizing their mutual interests in
avoiding rivalry, the independent firms may produce monopoly-like results
without explicit communication.2 0
19 1 have no intention of reproducing a textbook exegesis on the various "models"
of market structure, such as perfect competition, pure monopoly, monopolistic com-
petition, imperfect competition, and oligopoly. Each of these (and others) has a specific
meaning, but at the present level of reality the distinctions seem unhelpful. The dis-
cussion in the text emphasizes rivalry on the selling side of the market; similar con-
ditions should exist for competitive rivalry on the buying side otherwise monopsony
power exists. For those who are familiar with the economic models of market structure,
the emphasis on price rivalry should seem closer to "workable competition" than to the
abstract "perfect competition" in which individual rivals fail to recognize their neighbors
as rivals (e.g., farmers). This emphasis is intentional, since the oligopolistic condition of
fewness usually provides the circumstances for particular mergers.
The emphasis in the text rests on markets and market structures. Some observers
see undesirable effects resulting from absolute size of individual firms, regardless of
their position in a market context - J. NAxVER, EDWARDS, AND BLAIR, supra note 1, seem to
approximate this view at times. The courts have, since 1920, explicitly rejected the
view that "mere size is an offense." United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S.
417, 451 (1920). There may be, however, a non-economic argument against mere size:
e.g., political influence becomes excessive, or economic dependence upon a few business
managers is increased. See amplifications of these sociological, psychological, and political
views in several of the items cited above. See also J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
91 (1968); Machlup, Oligopoly and the Free Society, I ANTITRUST LAW & EcON. REv.
11 (1967).
20 Pre-World War II Alcoa is a prime example of a "single firm" monopoly, United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), although some alterna-
tive producers (some foreign aluminum producers as well as suppliers of imperfectly
substitutable products such as copper and steel) did exist. The economic (competition)
issue is the availability of substitutes, as the Court pointed out in the Cellophane Case
(United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956), a Sherman Act
section 2 case, as was Alcoa):
The ultimate consideration . . . is whether the defendants control the price and
competition in the market for such part of trade or commerce as they are
charged with monopolizing. Every manufacturer is the sole producer of the
particular commodity it makes but its control of the relevant market [supply]
depends upon the availability of alternative commodities for buyers: i.e., whether
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In the long run, where such supply restriction is possible, prices deviate
from (are above) costs of production, as the firms with monopoly power
obtain monopoly profits. If competition exists, then customers face a selec-
tion of alternative suppliers, and the price (or price structure, to account
for varying qualities of substitutable products, e.g., grades of wheat or beef)
reflects costs of production. Should a single firm (or group of firms) attempt
to raise price above cost, the availability of alternative suppliers would
induce customers to shift patronage to these alternatives. Under conditions
of monopoly power (a single firm or a "few" firms acting together collec-
tively), customer alternatives are limited, and the suppliers can raise price
above-cost, restrict output sold in the market, and reap additional profit.21
there is a cross-elasticity of demand between [the product supplied by the de-
fendants and the products supplied by other firms].
Id. at 380 (emphasis added).
"(A) party has monopoly power if it has, over 'any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States', a power of controlling prices or unreasonably restricting com-
petition." Id. at 389. "Monopoly power is the power to control prices or exclude competi-
tion." Id. at 391. "Price and competition are so intimately entwined that any discussion
of theory must treat them as one." Id. at 392. After such superb economic pronounce-
ments, the Court badly misapplied its correct concepts by finding a largely non-existent
"reasonable interchangeability" between du Pont's cellophane and other flexible wrapping
materials (waxed paper, "Saran" wrap, glassine, aluminum foil, etc.). Stocking & Mueller,
The Cellophane Case and The New Competition, 45 AM. ECON. REv. 29 (1955), re-
printed in A. E. A. READINGS IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 118-50 (R.
Hefleblower & G. Stocking eds. 1958).
The problem of a "few" firms ("oligopolies') acting together (collectively, but not
collusively perhaps) to exercise monopoly power is illustrated by the Tobacco industry
whose big four during the 1930's controlled together between 68 and 90 percent of
the total United States production of "smaller cigarettes." American Tobacco Co. v.
United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946). Although the Court's analysis in this case is correct,
no appropriate remedy was devised; moreover, the anticipated attack on non-collusive
oligopolies has not materialized. Nichols, The Tobacco Case of 1946, 39 Am. EcoN. REV.
284 (1949), reprinted in R. Heflebower & G. Stocking, supra at 105-17. Whether new
"law" on the legal position of oligopolies was made seems moot. Compare C. KAYSEN &
D. TURER, ANTITRUST POLICY 108 (1959) with Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive
Instrument of Progress, 14 U. CHI. L. REV. 567 (1947). These cases are Sherman Act cases;
however, "restraints of trade" and "monopolizing" are economic synonyms for restriction
of supply (to raise price and increase profit). Perhaps the notion of "combinations" as
used in section 1 can be used to attack "conglomerates who engage in restrictive trade
practices." Baker, Combinations and Conspiracies-Is There a Difference?, 14 ANTITRUST
BULL. 71, 89 (1969). Whether that notion should be so used, however, is another ques-
tion.
21 Persistent and important deviations from competitive performance appear regularly
in empirical work. These deviations produce a positive statistical relationship between
fewness of suppliers (some variant of market shares for a few firms) and market per-
formance (some variant of profit rates or price-cost relationships). For a recent example,
see Miller, Market Structure and Industrial Performance, 17 J. INDUST. EcoN. 104 (1969).
It should be noted that cartels and tacit collusion are inherently unstable; they may
"break down" as price chiselers (price competitors) or "break away" to pursue price pol-
icies independent of the cartel or tacit agreement. Such a maverick firm recognizes that if
everyone else honors the agreed price, he can benefit tremendously by independent
(i.e., lower) pricing. But if every party to the agreement decides to be a maverick ....
The practical problems which face cartel members in maintaining their agreements are
documented in e.g., H. MACROSTY, THE TRUST MOVEMENT IN BRITISH INDUSTRY (1907) (re-
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If competitive and monopolistic behavior relate to price and output
behavior, then changes in competition and monopoly power should relate
to an increased or diminished ability (by sellers) to influence price and out-
put in the market. An increase in monopoly power should thus mean an
increased ability to restrict output (and raise price), and an increase in
competition should mean a diminished power over price and output. Since
lessening of competition (or increases in monopoly power) is the test under
section 7, the effect on price and output should determine the outcome in
merger cases.22
Mergers between suppliers of substitutable products in the same mar-
ket 23 reduce the alternatives available to consumers; if the merging partners
printed in 1968); G. STOCKING & M. WATKINS, CARTELS IN ACTION (1946); Smith, The
Incredible Electrical Conspiracy, FORTUNE, Apr. 1961, at 132, and May 1961, at 161. De.
spite the tendency for cartels to collapse, they are reformed to be successful for a time
before mavericks reappear. And tacit agreements on price and output suffer the same
uncertain instability, but such tacit agreements are sufficiently successful to produce
noticeable and significant results for the participants.
22 The assumption is that economic concepts deserve economic interpretation; on
this basis the participation of economists in discussions of antitrust policy is relevant.
Probabilities (rather than certainties) and "substantially" lessened competition are un-
derstood to pertain, also.
23 The redundancy here in defining horizontal mergers involves the definition of
substitutable: if products are not substitutes, they obviously are not in the same market.
Any of the dimensions of a market-product ("line of commerce"), geography ("section
of the country"), and time- can preclude substitutability: e.g., haircuts today in Brook-
lyn are not substitutes for haircuts today in Chicago; "The Guns of Navarone" (re-
leased in 1961), is now appearing to a different market in time (tonight's TV). A British
observer is not so sanguine: "That Section VII says that a merger to be illegal must
lessen competition in 'a line of commerce' and that the economy in general has never
yet been defined in the courts as a line of commerce does not worry [the present U.S.
Assistant Attorney General in charge of Antitrust]." THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 11, 1969, at 45.
Perhaps this observer is correct (although he may not be unbiased, given the at-
tempts to block the British Petroleum-Standard Oil of Ohio merger, although the merger
now presumably has Justice Department approval. Dept. of Justice Press Release (Nov.
17, 1969)). In arguing for an injunction barring the acquisition of the Grinnell Corporation
and The Hartford Fire Insurance Company by the International Telephone and Tele-
graph Corporation, government attorneys "introduced evidence that in the last two
decades there has been an increasing concentration of economic power in the hands of
fewer and larger corporate entities." ITT is the l1th largest industrial corporation in the
United States based on sales, Grinnell, the 268th largest. A careful reading of the district
court opinion denying the motions for preliminary injunctions indicates that the De-
partment of Justice is attempting to use increases in "overall concentration" (as defined
previously, supra note 8, and indicated in Table II) as an argument in section 7 cases.
The court carefully and correctly distinguished increases in overall concentration (re-
sulting from mergers of large corporations) from increases in market or industry con-
centration (resulting from mergers of rival sellers), basing the legal importance of the
economic distinction on the congressional intent embodied in section 7. Indeed the
court notes the differences ("conflict") between two Assistant Attorneys General in this
regard: Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REv.
1313, 1393-95 (1965), and McLaren, Statement Before House Ways and Means Comm.,
March 12, 1969, as cited in United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 306 F. Supp.
766, 796 n. 92 (D. Conn. 1969). Other arguments used by the Government in this case
are consistent with the text. See also Adelman, The Antimerger Act 1950-1960, 51 AM.
EcoN. REv. 236 (1961).
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are sufficiently large, the alternatives may be reduced by a significant
amount and hence competition may be lessened. Conglomerate mergers,
by definition, are mergers of firms which supply products in different
markets. The markets may be different geographically (hence the subcat-
egory "market extension" merger) or different in a product sense (including
the "product extension" conglomerate merger).24 But they are different
markets. The ownership of the assets changes with the merger, but the
alternatives facing the consumer do not change. The number of firms, the
distribution of output among these firms, brands and brand name alle-
giance, the height of barriers to the entry of new firms into the market, and
other aspects of market structure which bear on price and output decisions
in a market seem not to change; a conglomerate merger, without more, can
scarcely lessen competition or increase monopoly. Whatever logic is applied
in conglomerate merger cases, to meet congressional expectation in the
section 7 revision, must face this argument.2 5
Although few conglomerate mergers have been prosecuted, an outline
of the "competition lessening" aspects of those mergers is emerging. Two
lines26 exist to this analysis linking conglomerate mergers and a lessening
24 Both these terms seem slightly misleading. "Market extension" mergers occur
"when the acquiring and acquired companies manufacture the same products, but sell
them in different geographic markets." A better name might be "geographic market ex-
tension" or "market area extension" merger. "A merger is considered to be product ex-
tension in type when the acquiring and acquired companies are functionally related in
production and/or distribution but sell products which do not compete directly with one
another [are not substitutable in the consumers' eyes]." BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, FTC,
LARGE MERGERS IN MANUFACTURING AND MINING No. 6-15-2, at 4-5 (1969). But what is
"functionally related"? Does this imply economies of joint production, or perhaps some
degree of imperfect substitutability either in production or in consumption? Perhaps a
new classification of mergers is necessary, possibly based upon the purposes of the mer-
gers rather than on the market relationships of the parties, to amend the trichotomy
of horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate.
25 The published works listed in note 1 do not, I think, meet this argument di-
rectly. In addition, I see no inconsistency between the argument of this and the pre-
ceding four paragraphs and the "General Enforcement Policy" (paragraph 2) of the
Merger Guidelines of the Dep't of Justice Press Release at 2-3 (May 30, 1968) [herein-
after cited as Merger Guidelines]:
IT1he primary role of Section 7 enforcement is to preserve and promote market
structures conducive to competition. Market structure is the focus of the De-
partment's merger policy chiefly because the conduct of the individual firms in
a market tends to be controlled by the structure of that market, i.e., by those
market conditions which are fairly permanent or subject to slow change (such as,
principally, the number of substantial firms selling in the market, the relative
sizes of their respective market shares, and the substantiality of barriers to the
entry of new firms into the market).
There is a disclaimer, however:
[I]n the area of conglomerate merger activity, the incomplete state of knowledge
concerning structure - conduct relationships may preclude sole reliance on the
structural criteria used in these guidelines ...
Id. at 3-4.
26 These two lines are set out in the Mergers Guidelines 18, 19. In choosing cases
to be prosecuted, the Department of Justice gives opportunity to the courts to "make
merger policy." Insofar as the courts accept the conglomerate merger arguments of the
Guidelines and of cases brought by the Justice Department, these paragraphs seem to be
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of competition: (1) mergers between firms, one of which is removed as a
potentially substantial entrant into the other's market, and (2) mergers
between firms which sell unrelated products to each other, thus raising the
possibility of the two firms simultaneously "favoring" each other. The "po-
tential entry" argument involves essentially the requirement that the merger
removes a substantial potential entrant from entry contention, thus leaving
the existing firms less in danger of alternative suppliers relieving them of
their customers by price competition; the effect is equivalent to an increase
in the barriers to the entry of new firms, i.e., a change in the structural
characteristics of the market. This argument, however, requires a demonstra-
tion that other potential entrants (not part of the conglomerate merger)
present substantially less chance of entry than the merging firm. The supply
of "potential entrants" into most markets, while probably not inexhaustible,
may be large enough to make such a demonstration difficult.27 The identi-
reasonably accurate predictions of the course of merger policy over the next decade or
so. In addition, recent court decisions seem to argue along these lines: FTC v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967), and FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592
(1965). However, the ITT-Grinnell-Hartford Insurance case (supra note 23) indicates an
additional, and recently added, argument involving "increases in 'overall concentration."'
The 1968 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE REPORT ON ANTITRUST POLICY lists a third line of
argument: "the addition of large resources to a firm already dominant in a market,
possibly insulating its position from erosion through competition." J. NARVER, supra note
1, at ch. 5, sees another thread developing in the conglomerate merger cases: the large
size ("wealth") of a conglomerate firm permits it to shift resources to the detriment of
competition.
Narver and others emphasize the ability granted by a conglomerate's "long purse"
to subsidize localized price cutting (predatory pricing) and to undertake advertising.
However, predation is questionable as a profitable tactic for any firm. McGee, Predatory
Price Cutting, 1 J. LAw & EcoN. 137 (1958). Advertising expenditures can raise barriers to
new entry, J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION ch. 4 (1956); J. BAIN, supra note 8,
at chs. 7, 8 (1968); Comanor & Wilson, Advertising, Market Structure, and Performance,
49 Rtv. ECON. & STATS. 423-40 (1967); but conglomerate mergers are not prerequisites for
intensive advertising. Stocking's "Comment" on Edwards' article, in BusINEsS CONCENTRA-
TION AND PRICE POLICY 352-359 (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research ed. 1955), provides a
careful rebuttal to these and other issues concerning the links between conglomerate
bigness and market (or monopoly) power.
27 The Merger Guidelines specify that challenges to conglomerate mergers will be
made when the merger involves "one of the most likely entrants into the market" and
a firm with certain specified market shares operating in an industry with specified con-
centration ratios. Id. at 22. Continuing,
In determining whether a firm is one of the most likely potential entrants
into a market, the Department accords primary significance to the firm's cap-
ability of entering on a competitively significant scale relative to the capability
of other firms (i.e., the technological and financial resources available to it)
and to the firm's economic incentive to enter (evidenced by, for example, the
general attractiveness of the market in terms of risk and profit; or any special
relationship of the firm to the market; or the firm's manifested interest in
entry; or the natural expansion pattern of the firm; or the like).
Id. at 22-23. Is the entire field of large firms in United States manufacturing- the
relevant population of potential entrants for a conglomerate merger-to be surveyed in
each case this argument is used? Determination of "one of the most likely entrants"
seems tantamount to per se prohibition of conglomerate (perhaps all) mergers by large
firms-clearly not the congressional intent , or it seems to rest on a statistically ran-
dom basis. See Brodley, Oligopoly Power Under The Sherman and Clayton Acts- From
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fication of "the most likely potential entrant" seems fraught with un-
certainty.
The "reciprocal buying" argument rests on the judgment that it is "an
economically unjustified business practice which confers a competitive ad-
vantage on the favored firm unrelated to the merits of its product."28 These
arrangements are undesirable, the argument goes, because some competitors
may be foreclosed and hence competition lessened. This argument seems
to disregard the purposes of reciprocal buying arrangements. Market power
in sales, which is the evil of reciprocity, cannot be "created" from the
leverage of market power in purchases: profit maximization in each of these
independent markets requires independent pricing policies. Reciprocal
buying, if made possible through conglomerate mergers, may accomplish
increased profits for the merging firms not by increasing overall monopoly
power but by shifting purchases and by adjusting the prices of the ex-
changed products. 29 Situations in which this may occur include the evasion
of a minimum or set price imposed formally by regulatory commissions; a
"secret price cut" by an oligopolist (when an oligopolistic price may other-
wise prevail, since open price-chiseling would be too expensive); and the
opportunity to effect price discrimination, where arbitrage (without con-
glomerate merger and reciprocal dealing) would preclude price differences.
The presumption is strong that each of these situations involves increased,
rather than restricted supply of the product(s), and hence more, not less,
competitive activity.
III. CIRCUMSTANCES FOR CONGLOMERATE DIVERSITY: FOUR EXAMPLES
Preceding sections have indicated that conglomerate mergers dominate
the current merger movement and that corporate diversity, which is in-
creased by conglomerate mergers, is widespread in manufacturing and is
increasing throughout the economy. Emphasis in antitrust action against
conglomerate mergers seems to rest on the possibility of reciprocity and
the removal of a likely potential entrant. Conglomerate diversity, of course,
may occur as the result of internal corporate expansion into new markets,
as well as by merger. The advantages of conglomerate diversity8 ° for a
Economic Theory to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L. Ray. 285, 354-61 (1967); Turner, supra
note 23, at 1352-86.
28 Merger Guidelines, supra note 25, at 19. For contrary views to the text, again,
see Brodley, supra note 27, at 325-29, and Turner, supra note 23, at 1386-93.
29 Anderson, Reciprocal Dealing, 76 YALE L.J. 1020 (1967). This comment is another
in a line of analyses of the "leverage" problem in several contexts (tie-in sales, exclusive
dealing, and vertical mergers). But see, e.g., Hausman, Reciprocal Dealing and The
Antitrust Laws, 77 HARV. L. REV. 873 (1964), and Stocking & Mueller, Business Reciprocity
and the Size of Firms, 30 J. Bus. 73 (1957), as two examples of reciprocity analysis which
do not recognize the role of pricing. The last sentence in the latter article is "[reciprocal
dealing] is one of the several tools in the oligopolist's kit designed to increase sales
without resorting to price cutting." Id. at 95. Actually reciprocal dealing may be a
method by which price cutting is brought about in oligopolistic or regulated markets!
I 0 In further discussion, "diversity" should be understood to mean "conglomerate
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diversified firm, the circumstances under which diversity is profitable, shed
light on competitive and monopolistic aspects and provide insights for
merger policy. The reasons or circumstances presented here involve risk
and sales variability, cost efficiency, financial gain through stock transfers,
and reciprocity. Analysis of each of these indicates that conglomerate
mergers and corporate diversity may improve competition or be neutral,
contrary to the analysis contained in current merger policy.
1. Shifting Demands: Risk Reduction and Inverse Relationships
Often a firm can predict only imperfectly the demand for its product.
Shifts in demand produce fluctuations in profits. If a firm desires to reduce
risk (relative to overall net worth, or sales, or assets), it can diversify into
another market where risk may exist but where the shifts in demand (which
give rise to the risk) are not perfectly correlated with shifts in demand in
the original market. The overall riskiness (expected variability in total
profit, relative to total assets or net worth or sales) is reduced, even though
risk in each market (relative to assets, net worth, or sales relative to that
market) is unaffected. Without reducing the level of expected earnings (the
weighted mean of the means of profit probability distribution), a firm can
reduce the overall risk, i.e., the variability of expected profits (relative to
total sales, or assets, or net worth). Corporations may reduce risk by placing
their producing "eggs" in different market "baskets." 31 In addition, the un-
certain results of research and development activities may lead to diversifi-
cation. A diversified firm is more likely to be able to use or exploit the
uncertain outcomes of research, because research productivity assumes un-
predictable dimensions. A wide spectrum of products which a firm may pro-
duce reduces the possibility that an invention need be sold in the very
imperfect market for inventions, where the sales price may understate the
economic value of invention. 2
diversity," omitting the vertical dimensions to the broader concept. Some of the analysis,
however, is applicable to both conglomerate and vertical aspects of mergers and di-
versity.
31 "[D]iversification is at times a defensive measure intended to counteract declines
in demand for the primary activities of companies." M. GORT, DIVERSIFICATION AND
INTEGRATION IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 48 (1962). On the general point of overall risk re-
duction (or profits stabilization), see J. NEEDHAM, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS AND INDUSTRIAL
STRUCTUR-E 127-28 (1969); Gort, Diversification, Mergers, and Profits, in THE CORPORATE
MERGER 39-41 (W. Alberts & J. Segall eds. 1966) (hereinafter cited as W. Alberts &
J. Segall]. For a more detailed, statistical analysis, see Alberts, The Profitability of
Growth by Merger, in W. Alberts & J. Segall at 262-72; Fisher, Towards A Theory of
Diversification, 13 OxFoRD EcON. PAPERS 293 (1961).
32J. NEEDHAM, supra note 31, at 131-32. There is some question of the direction of
cause and effect between R&D effort and diversification. Grabowski, The Determinants
of Industrial Research and Development: A Study of the Chemical, Drug, and Petroleum
Industries, 76 J. POL. & ECON. 292-306 (1968), argues the opposite of my argument, to
which M. GORT, DIVERSIFICATION AND INTEGRATION IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY ch. 7 (1962),
provides some supporting evidence, which Needham rebuts. Even if a firm can predict
fluctuations in its sales exactly, it may choose to diversify into a second activity where
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2. Cost Efficiency
Despite the usual assumption that business firms minimize the cost
of production for whatever rate of output they choose, some firms are
"badly managed." Existing managers do not employ the most efficient
production or marketing methods, fail to innovate, display negligence or
indolence, or otherwise incur costs and forego profits that need not be in-
curred or foregone. Such a firm is ripe for "take over" and some manage-
ment house-cleaning. A conglomerate merger is one device for injecting the
firm with new management and hence for reducing costs of operation, or
innovating, or otherwise improving the profitability of that firm.3
3. Financial Gain Through Stock Transfers
Creation of a conglomerate firm, through merger, may be related not
to the market decisions in production and exchange of commodities but
instead to the price movements of shares of stock. The price of a stock
on the market depends, to some substantial extent, on its price-earnings
ratio. The price-earnings ratios differ among stocks because investors value
their future earnings prospects differently. Consider the following example
of Marvin May:
Company A stock is selling at a price-earnings ratio of 30 because of ex-
pected growth of 33% per year in its earnings per share. Company B is
sales fluctuations are negatively correlated with sales fluctuations on the first market.
Seasonal examples abound: coal and ice merchants; egg producers (winter) who cater
to vacationers (summer); resort operators and employees who travel between Maine and
Florida. These are examples (of a temporal kind) of diversifying to utilize "spare [under-
employed] resources." See Gort, in W. Alberts & J. Segall, supra note 31, at 35-39; Al-
berts, in W. Alberts & J. Segall, supra note 31, at 262.
Seasonal (and other negatively correlated) demand fluctuations may be considered as
one form of technological interdependence, where outputs are related in a temporal
manner. Another form of technological interdependence is joint production. Some firms
are diversified simply because their production processes involve products sold in differ-
ent product (rather than temporal) markets: Slaughter houses sell meat and hides be-
cause animals grow both products. Oil refineries produce gasoline, kerosene, fuel oil,
lubricating oil, and petrochemical raw materials because crude oil cannot be transformed
into only one of these products without excessive cost. The most widely cited example
is wool and mutton. Where the production processes of different products are intimately
related, however, mergers are not the vehicle for achieving diversity; i.e., the marginal
costs of these joint products may be considered low. This, too, is an example of "spare
[underemployed] resources."
35 If a firm desires conglomerate growth, then its managers must weigh the relative
merits of internal expansion and external mergers. Mergers for growth are more attractive
than internal expansion if the stock of the acquired firm is sufficiently undervalued prior
to the merger; if the value of the stock completely discounts the anticipated cost savings,
then the acquiring firm obtains no benefit from merger via internal expansion. In such
a comparison, the managers must also consider the effect on price of the product which
might occur as the result of internal expansion: new capacity in the entered market may
reduce price by a substantial amount.
For some examples of cost reduction effected by conglomerate mergers, see Phelan,
Business Considerations in Merging, 12 ANTrrRusT BULL. 147 (1967); Turner, supra note
23, at 1323-39.
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not expected to have any growth and its stock is selling at a price-earnings
ratio of 10. Both firms are earning $1.00 per share and both have 1,000,000
shares outstanding. The price of Company A stock is $30.00 per share and
the price of Company B stock is $10.00 per share. Company A offers to
acquire all of the stock of Company B by exchanging stock on the basis
of one-half share ($15.00's worth) of Company A stock for each share of
Company B stock. This is 50% over market for Company B stock and
the offer is accepted.
The transaction is completed. No change in operating earnings occur
during the next period, and the combined earnings remain at $2,000,000.
At this point Company A has 1,500,000 shares outstanding, the 1,000,000
which were out before the acquisition plus 500,000 new shares issued to
acquire Company B. Earnings per share of Company A stock thus rise to
$1.33, a growth of 33%/ as expected. The price-earnings ratio remains at
30 and the stock price rises to $40.00 per share. Company A stockholders
are, of course, very pleased. The entire $1.33 in earnings is available for
dividends, and the price of their stock has risen 33% in addition. Former
Company B stockholders are equally pleased. Not only did they receive
50% more for their stock than the market price, but that one-half share of
Company A stock they received has already gone up in value from $15.00
to $20.00. They have doubled their net worth, at market prices, in less
than one year.94
The resulting growth in the price of A's stock, benefiting the stockholders,
some of whom engineered the merger; is independent of internal growth of
both' A and B. Instead, the growth in the price of A's shares - the objective
of the merger -evolves because the stock market values shares on the basis
of a stock's p/e and because A purchased a company with a lower p/e (at a
price intermediate to the two pre-merger p/e's). Like a chain letter, this
process will eventually produce a market fall for A's stock "when the con-
glomerate runs out of acquisitions"3 5 and internal growth is largely
absent. But if those who bring the merger about sell their own shares soon
enough, the day of reckoning comes to others.
Present accounting methods aid in playing the price-earnings game of
mergers. Under the "pooling-of-interest" method of accounting in merger
cases, the assets and liabilities of the two firms are merely added - as if they
married rather than as if one acquired the other. If a price higher than the
book value of assets was "paid" for the acquired firm through the issuance
of stock or other securities, the difference (the higher "cost") does not ap-
pear on the books after the merger.8 6 And through appropriate use of war-
34 May, The Earnings Per Share Trap, 24 FINAN. ANAL. J. 113-114 (1968). His discus-
sion continues by pointing to the readjustment problems which accompany the decline
in the rate of acquisition (here, an annual doubling of size of profits); when earnings
no longer increase at 33 percent per year, the 30:1 price-earnings ratio is starkly re-
vealed as an optimistic estimate by shareholders of future earnings. The point, of
course, is that such "growth" may come entirely by merger, with zero increases in total
sales and profits. May warns of the dangers and concludes: "[T]he rate of growth of
earnings per share is not an appropriate benchmark of growth for valuation purposes
when mergers or acquisitions are involved." Id. at 115.
35 Burck, The Merger Movement Rides High, FORTUNE, Feb. 1969, at 81.
36 See, e.g., Briloff, Distortions Arising from Pooling-of-Interests Accounting, 24
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rants, convertible debentures, as well as common stock, the acquiring firm
may "profit" even if the merger falls through.37 And an exchange of stock,
unlike the dollar purchase of a firm, delays the capital-gains tax liability for
stockholders of the acquired firm.
Financial entrepreneurs may produce conglomerate firms by merger
through use of the tax laws, security regulations, and accounting practices;
the financial rewards (incentives) for merging may come from changes in
stock prices (aided, of course, by those tax laws, security regulations and
accounting practices), not from any increase in monopoly power in the
product markets.38 The real question raised here for antitrust policy is
whether or not the antitrust laws are appropriate to support the Securities
and Exchange Commission, to police the stock exchange, to plug tax loop-
holes, or to reform accounting practices.8 9
FINAN. ANAL. J. 71 (1968): The 'Funny-Money' Game, 25 FINAN. ANAL. J. 73 (1969). The
former analyzes the marriage of Gulf and Western Industries, Inc., with Paramount
Pictures Corporation; the latter analyzes the swallowing of Wilson & Company by Ling-
Temco-Vought. Both involved pooling of interests accounting which disguised, to the
benefit, presumably, of the managers, the actual financial effects of the mergers; Briloff
is able to unravel many of the threads in the public accounting records in a manner
which only CPA's- certainly not most investors in common stock- can do. The alter-
native method of accounting, involving outright purchase, does require a new basis of
accountability (which pooling of interest does not), namely the market price paid rather
than the book value of assets. In the ITT-Grinnell merger, the premium paid (over
book value) was $53 per share; for the ITT-Hartford Insurance merger, the premium,
was $28 per share. United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 766
(D. Conn. 1969).
57 Burck, supra note 35, at 158. If the unsuccessful acquiring firm can quietly pick
up a substantial block of the target firm's stock it may additionally profit by a rise in
the price of that stock when another firm acquires its intended target. Burck's examples:
Loew's Theaters Inc.'s unsuccessful bid for Commercial Credit (acquired by Control
Data); Gulf and Western's unsuccessful bid for Sinclair Oil (merged with Atlantic-
Richfield). Incidentally, corporate mergers may provide opportunities for financial ar-
bitrage, when there exists a "spread between two or more securities that are equivalent
in value but are trading at different prices due to some temporary market imbalance."
See Robertson, Personal Investing, FORTUNE, Feb. 1969, at 165-66.
88 Any study of the conglomerate merger movement would thus seem incomplete
without some attention to the financial aspects. These comments are designed only to
indicate that accounting practices, tax laws, and security regulations provide strong mo-
tives for some mergers, not to exhaustively list and analyze all the financial possibilities.
The concern of (some) accountants is reflected in Wyatt, A Critical Study of Accounting
for Business Combinations, AccoUNTINo REsF.ARscH STUDY No. 5 (1963), a study sponsored,
but not endorsed by the Institute. Chapter 6 points out, among other problems, that
pooling-of-interest now describes accounting procedures rather than a type of business
combination.
59 The merger movement at the turn of the century involved financial gain for its
entrepreneurs. The men who effected the mergers, whose names include Rockefeller,
Carnegie, Mellon, Moore, and Duke, produced firms with monopoly power in particular
markets by merging small, competitive firms. Inducing the owners of these competitive
firms to merge required that the anticipated monopoly profits be shared with those
owners, by attractive offers to purchase their stock. All the discounted prospective gain,
however, was not shared in this manner. These monopoly entrepreneurs (who were in
the industry of making monopolies) were more than handsomely rewarded by their
share of the discounted monopoly profits of the monopolies they formed. "Watered
stock" did, after all, have some basis in an increase in expected earnings if not in the
original cost of physical assets.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
4. Reciprocity for Competitive Behavior
Reciprocity, the practice of "buying from one's customers," may be
profitable for conglomerate firms under certain market conditions. If firm
A sells its product to firm B (and others), the conglomerate nature of A may
permit it to purchase B's product. The courts seem to have accepted the
following argument: the fact that A purchases from B permits A to increase
its sales to B, hence increase its monopoly power.40 However, the additional
restriction ("buy from me or I won't buy from you") is equivalent to an
additional cost imposed on the other party, and under competitive condi-
tions the abundance of alternative suppliers and customers renders the
restriction meaningless. 4 ' If firm A possesses monopsony power (ability to
affect the market price of purchased commodities) it will establish a profit
maximizing price by appropriate marginal considerations. An additional
restriction (reciprocity to increase sales of the other product) is the equiv-
alent of a lower, non-profit maximizing price for firm A in its monopso-
nized purchases. Firm A cannot both retain its entire monopsony power in
its purchases and expand its monopoly power in its sales; it must balance
its gains in sales with its foregone profits in purchases. If the establishment
of market prices can be done without outside interference, and if the
products are economically independent, reciprocity even under monopoly
conditions does not seem worthwhile.
On the other hand, if a firm does not possess freedom to price its
product as it wishes, and if it would (without this obstruction) establish a
different price, then reciprocity may become a profitable practice. Assume
that firm B is a regulated monopoly, i.e., the price for its product or service
is established by a regulatory commission. Incentives exist for both firm A
and firm B to evade the rate regulation, and reciprocity provides a mech-
anism. By purchasing increased output from A (at an inflated or monopoly
price), firm B can produce the effect of a price cut in its sales to A without
seeming to violate the price established by regulation. Reciprocity is sub-
stituted for an otherwise blatantly illegal price cut.42 Nor is regulation
40 FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
41 This section draws on the argument in Anderson, supra note 29, at 1027.
42 This argument evidently explains the circumstances in Waugh Equipment Com-
pany, 15 F.T.C. 232 (1931). Several officers of both Armour & Company and Swift and
Company, substantial users of railroad services, owned a controlling interest in Waugh,
a manufacturer of draft-gears and other equipment used on railroads. By playing al-
ternative rail lines against each other, these officers used the meat packers' purchase of
transportation service to influence the railroads' purchase of railroad equipment; Waugh
sales of draft-gears rose dramatically from 1 percent of the total in 1924 (prior to the
meat company officers' acquiring Waugh stock) to 35 percent in 1930 (after their
acquisition). The equivalent of a lower price on railroad service was effected by increased
purchases of Waugh gears (to the benefit not of Swift and Armour but of their officers!).
A similar arrangement involved Mechanical Manufacturing Company, also producer of
draft-gears (and bumping posts and centering devices) and Swift and Company; Mechan-
ical Manufacturing Co., 16 F.T.C. 67 (1932). See other citations in Anderson, supra note
29 passim. The same interpretation may be involved in whatever reciprocal dealings exist
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necessary; firm B, a member of an oligopoly or perhaps cartel, may desire
to cut its price but not irritate his fellow oligopolists or cartel members,
who may retaliate by meeting his price cut. The appearance of upholding
the oligopoly or cartel price can be maintained, and at the same time the
price may be secretly cut, if B engages in reciprocity. 43
CONCLUSIONS
The data of Section I indicate that conglomerate mergers are becoming
relatively (numerically and by value added) more important in the current
wave of corporate merger activity. In addition, the diversity of corporations
in particular industries seems to be increasing in this postwar period.44
Despite the increased share of corporate assets held by the largest 50 (or
200) manufacturing firms, and despite the conglomerate merger activity,
concentration ratios reflecting an important dimension of market structure
seem not to have changed substantially.
Antitrust policy may be headed toward a strong stance against con-
glomerate mergers, at least if one firm is large, where large is measured
against other firms either in an industry or in the economy as a whole. The
arguments of reciprocity and entry barriers seem weak in linking con-
glomerate mergers, even among large firms, to the condition that, for il-
legality, competition must probably be lessened or monopoly increased by
such a merger. Section II thus suggests that the acquisition of increased
or existed between the railroads and General Motors Corporation, the largest commer-
cial shippers in the country" and also the largest manufacturer (GM's Electro-Motive
Division) of diesel railroad locomotives. United States v. General Motors Corp., 5 TADE
REG. Rn'. 45,063, at 52,513 (N.D. Ill. June 2, 1967).
The evasion of rate regulation may be present in two other contexts: tying agreements,
Bowman, Tying Arrangements and The Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19-36 (1957)
(e.g., Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958)) and vertical in-
tegration (e.g., United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947)). Whether the anti-
trust laws should be employed to enforce governmentally regulated prices is open to
some question. See also Ferguson, Tying Arrangements and Reciprocity: An Economic
Analysis, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 552 (1965). A defendant might attempt to escape an
antitrust charge of "lessening competition" by demonstrating increased competition by
the evasion of rate regulation. Even if unsuccessful, he thereby opens himself to gen-
erally greater penalties for violating regulation of rates.
43 Gentry was an oligopolist in both the dehydrated onion and garlic markets. Con-
ceivably Consolidated's purchases from food processors, who also purchased onion and
garlic, were the equivalent of a price cut in those markets. Gentry's share of dehydrated
onion sales rose from 28 to 35 percent of the industry sales from 1950 to 1958; however,
its shares of dehydrated garlic sales fell from 51 percent to 39 percent. Factual evidence
on the existence of reciprocal dealing in this case was weak, however. Consolidated Food
Corp. v. FTC, 329 F.2d 626, 626-27 (7th Cir. 1964).
44 We generally do not know the extent to which conglomerate mergers have con-
tributed to the increase in corporate diversity. Professor Willard Mueller, former Di-
rector of the Bureau of Economics of the Federal Trade Commission, apparently believes
that mergers are almost the entire cause of the relative growth of assets of the largest
200 corporations. Wall Street Journal, Nov. 5, 1969, at 34, col. 1-2, reporting his testimony
before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
after delivering the FTC Staff Study on conglomerate mergers.
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monopoly power is a doubtful motive which cannot be relied upon to
explain conglomerate mergers.
If the increase in monopoly power is a doubtful motive, then conglom-
erate mergers need interpretation by resort to other circumstances. Section
III indicates four circumstances which may lead to conglomerate mergers:
(1) shifting demands which are either inversely related to each other (per-
haps in a predictable manner) or imperfectly correlated (and somewhat
unpredictable); (2) reduction in cost; (3) financial gain through stock trans-
fers; and (4) reciprocity for competitive behavior. These circumstances
seem conducive to the conglomerate merger.
Cost reduction leads not to higher prices and reduced output but to
lower prices and increased output through a more efficient use of resources.
Reduction of risk and utilization of spare resources seem both neutral on
monopoly augmentation grounds and socially desirable. Financial gain
through stock transfer likewise seems neutral in its price and output effects
in any product market; here the purpose is gain through changes in the
prices of shares of stock.4 5 And reciprocity may lead not to monopoly
creation (despite the analysis of current policy) but to increases in com-
petitive rivalry either through the evasion of rate regulation or through
indirect but effective price cutting in oligopolistic markets. The White
House Task Force on Antitrust Policy 46 has proposed new legislation to con-
trol conglomerate mergers: a large firm (assets exceeding $250 million or
annual sales exceeding $500 million) would be prohibited from acquiring
a leading firm in an industry (a firm among the largest four, with 10 percent
or more of sales, where the industry sales exceed $100 million and the four
firm concentration ratio is 50 percent or more). A member of that Task Force
warns that this proposed anti-conglomerate merger act is not supported by
a "set of research materials showing a relationship between concentration
of general economic activity in conglomerates and anticompetitive be-
havior."47 Indeed, none exists, a lack which is in sharp contrast with the
empirical support for the Task Force recommendation to reduce concen-
tration in particular industries. 46 More importantly, prohibition of conglom-
erate mergers might just negate those competitive economic goals which
antitrust laws presumably embody.
45 But other measures, e.g., a revision of accounting procedures for mergers, may be
required. See notes 34-38 supra.
46 1968 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE REPORT ON ANTITRUST POLICY, 115 CONG. REc. 5642
(daily ed. May 27, 1969).
47 Id. at 5658 (Professor Paul W. MacAvoy in an appended Separate Statement).
48 See note 21 supra. Moreover, as Section III attempts to indicate, and as Berry's
(supra note 8) statistical analysis seems tentatively to show, the relationships between
conglomerate mergers (or corporate diversity) and monopoly creation may be just the
reverse of those relationships necessary to support the Task Force merger proposal.
